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Public control and strategic governance in state-
owned public utilities: empirical evidence from 
Italian listed firms
Stefano Bresciani - Manlio Del Giudice - Armando Papa 
Abstract
Purpose of the paper: The present research investigates the governance of Italian 
public utilities whose top management is engaged in balancing the conflicting pressures 
of the business model and the social functions. In this regard, public control appears 
to influence only the form of ownership structure. Conversely, the nature of the public 
management mechanisms does appear to substantially affect the management side of 
these organisations.
Methodology: The research performed an empirical quantitative evaluation of 
the 13 public utilities listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. In line with mainstream 
literature methodology, the ownership and governance structures are provided for each 
company, in the context of the government’s intention to maintain its central role in the 
management and control of the business activities.
Findings: With reference to and in line with the best practices, as acknowledged 
by international literature on corporate governance, interesting predictions emerge, 
in relation to the degree of ownership concentration and dominance exercised by the 
government within the company. Corporate governance and board composition are 
further found to represent good proxies of the level of public management discretion in 
the decision-making process.
Research limitations/implications: The specificity of the research’s geographic 
focus (i.e. Italy) de facto implies that there are some country-specific conditions that 
affect the industrial behaviour and financial performance of the observed firms in a 
different way than they would in other countries; thus, prohibiting generalisations 
in the international context. Additionally, the analysis does not adequately take into 
account the interference effects between industries (e.g. cross-sectorial learning). 
Finally, the research is largely interpretative and exploratory. And while this provides a 
solid scientific foundation for further research it does not, itself, subject any hypothesis 
to statistical testing and validation.
Originality of the paper: The research sheds light on the subject of managing 
conflicting demands, top management’s autonomy and the preservation of the 
significant role of the public as well, in relation to public utilities organisations. It is an 
original study with Italy in its focus, but with international significance, which reframes 
managerial debates concerning privatization and public utilities functioning.
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1. Introduction 
Public utilities generally constitute privatistic organisations which 
otherwise maintain the infrastructure on behalf of public services and are 
subject to public control and regulation ranging from local community-
based groups to state-wide government monopolies.
The Italian public utilities’ sector has undergone significant changes 
both in regulation policies as well as in terms of managerial practices in 
the course of the last two decades. Rising pressures to decrease public 
expenditures have led governments to reduce the resources devoted to 
public-owned firms. Moreover, the presence of multiple stakeholders 
made it necessary to find a balance between lowering costs, serving social 
needs and improving services (Martinez et al., 2013).
At the end of the ’90s such process of liberalization was initiated leading 
to the privatization and, in some cases, to quotation of various municipal 
enterprises. Another element of change was a deep merger and acquisition 
process that further effected important strategic transformations 
(Gilardoni et al., 2009a; 2009b; Cristofoli and Valotti, 2008). The most 
essential ramification was the modification of the governance structure and 
operating rules, both at strategic and managerial levels. The incorporation 
of private capital into public firms further enhanced the need to operate 
akin to private firms’ embracing of profit orientation, value maximisation 
and acting in a competitive mode within the public and private sector 
(Calabrò et al., 2013; Cambini and Rondi, 2011; Gilardoni, 2007; Garlatti, 
2000, 2001; Elefanti, 2003). 
Recently, a new culture of local public services has been evolving in 
Italy. This novel development entails growing attempts to overtake the 
utility model as a city service (formerly municipalized) to a different 
approach stemming from the cooperation between public enterprises 
(owned by municipalities) and private firms; with the ambition to export 
locally developed skills into new domestic and non-domestic markets 
(Menozzi et al., 2014; Ricci and Landi, 2009; Dezi et al., 2005).
In light of these transformations, this research aims to investigate the 
manner in which upper echelon management deals with the conflicting 
pressures between the business model and the social functions. The article 
consists of two parts: the first part presents a conceptual framework based 
on a literature review. It focuses on the latest national and international 
research on Italian public utilities governance, particularly the impact of 
liberalization on ownership structure and corporate governance, and the 
need to protect the public interest while simultaneously managing private 
companies. The second part provides an empirical analysis on company 
structure and corporate governance of Italian public utilities listed on the 
Milan Stock Exchange. The analysis sheds light on the patterns of handling 
the conflicting demands; specifically, elucidating models of governance 
that reconcile the conflicting pressures by retaining top management’s 
autonomy and in parallel preserving the significant role of the public.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 The case of Italian public utilities 
In many European countries, the state ownership of public utilities is 
being abandoned in favour of private ownership with public regulation in 
order to prevent market abuse. The phenomenon has been particularly felt 
in UK which first of all privatised its major utilities and introduced a form 
of regulation that, in a short term, has become a model of best practice to 
succeed in this market (Parker, 2006). 
Public utilities in Italy, conversely, have always functioned as companies 
under public control provided by state-owned organisations. In fact, since 
1900 the Italian public utilities have been operating under a rigid public 
control in the context of monopoly, devoid of competition. In practice, 
the governments and political agents have had an exclusive authority over 
the nominations of managers and/or board of directors whom were solely 
responsible for the management of the service, absolved of competing 
market forces. 
In order to prevent monopoly market-dominance, this situation has been 
modified in the course of the ’90s whereabouts state ownership of public 
utilities is being switched in favour of private ownership with a state regulation 
control. Legislative changes have introduced and promoted competition 
in parts of the utilities industry where it has been feasible. Furthermore, 
special purpose companies have been created for essential public utilities 
such as telecommunication, gas, electricity and water and sewerage sectors. 
At the same time, a structure of independent governance regulators has been 
created ad-hoc in order to stimulate competition in the market as well as to 
forestall inefficiencies by mismanagement. Thus, a process of liberalization 
that led various municipal enterprises to privatization and, in some cases, to 
quotation, characterized the Italian public utilities sector. Moreover, there 
was a series of mergers and acquisitions that caused structural strategic 
changes, such as turnovers and prices policy (Hansen, 2014; Gilardoni et al., 
2009a; 2009b; Cristofoli and Valotti, 2008). Consequently, public utilities are 
nowadays compelled to compete in the new context of market liberalization 
(Abatecola and Poggesi, 2010). The most important consequence of these 
transformations, indicated above, was the separation between the public 
local government and the company, which in turn fostered the ambition, 
and actual attempts to export locally developed skills into new domestic and 
non-domestic markets (Ricci and Landi, 2009; Dezi et al., 2005). 
At the same time, private investors have been invited to participate 
financially in public utilities to boost competition and to improve 
performance. Furthermore, a change in the legal framework of public 
utility has been introduced. Specifically, new legislation has been issued in 
order to distinguish the political aspects from the managerial ones. Prior 
to such reforms, public utilities enjoyed the status of a municipal company, 
an autonomous organisation created by a governmental decree, while the 
owner (often the municipality) had the authority to appoint the board of 
directors. 
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Differently from the UK, we have also to consider the important 
role of regulation and country-specific government conditions. These 
depend, otherwise, on the institutional context of entrepreneurship, which 
makes the Italian context very singular for the dominance of family and 
state-controlled businesses. This highlights that one country’s corporate 
governance system cannot be successfully adapted by another country - sic 
est - without considering a set of very different institutional and economic 
constraints. In this regard, the Italian financial market presents systemic 
singularities that make it difficult to produce a benchmark internationally 
and, reasonably, becomes less replicable from an empirical standpoint.
In particular, the “Italian affair” context has exacerbated the economic 
and social problems, reflected in conflicting demands posed on the public 
utilities firms: on the one hand they are charged with providing services 
to citizens, assuring quality and satisfying public interests (Tardivo and 
Quaglia, 2014; Bresciani and Ferraris, 2014; Ferraris, 2014; Bresciani et 
al., 2013; Baccarani, 1995); and on the other hand they have to maximize 
shareholders value thus acting contrary to social logics and orientation 
(Calabrò and Torchia, 2011; Elefanti and Cerrato, 2009; Dallocchio et al., 
2001). Moreover, Asquer (2011) suggests that the difficulty to implement 
liberalization and regulatory reforms to the network industries in Italy 
may be explained by various concurrent mechanisms, which have to do 
with the rent-seeking behaviour of the actors in the industry’s community, 
the rise of barriers to entry against competitors, and the risk of collusive 
practices between the regulators and the regulated. At the same time, 
Mangia et al. (2013) contend that organizational change processes in 
the Italian public utilities are carried out with the purpose of obtaining 
institutional legitimacy, deploying behavioural control mechanisms, such 
as incentives and empowerment.
How can the public utilities firms engage such discordant concomitant 
pressures? In order to explicate this query, we draw on the organizational 
behaviour literature in the social conflict domain, and specifically the 
Dual Concern Model originally proposed by Blake and Mouton (1964), 
later adopted with some modifications by several scholars (Pruitt and 
Rubin, 1986; Rahim, 1983; Thomas and Schimdt, 1976). The fundamental 
premise of this conceptual framework maintains the conflict-management 
strategy adopted by an individual or organizational entity stems from two 
underlying motives: concern for self or one’s organization and concern for 
the other side. 
Furthermore, the model postulates that the level of these two motives 
depends on the specific contextual features of the conflict, which in turn 
shape the strategic choice of the parties: (a) Dominating (high concern for 
self and low concern for the other), manifested in attempts to persuade 
the other side to accept one’s position; (b) Obliging (low concern for self 
and high concern for the other), reflected in compliance with the other; 
(c) Avoiding (low concern for self and low concern for the other) that is 
refraining from confrontation with the conflict issues; (d) Integrating (high 
concern for self and high concern for the other), that is seeking mutually 
beneficial alternatives for resolving the conflict; (e) Compromising 
(moderate concern for self and moderate concern for the other), evident 
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in actions designed to identify middle-ground agreements (Syna Desivilya 
et al., 2005).
Extrapolating from this conceptual framework to the current context 
of the Italian public utility firms, that are conceivably they are facing a 
strategic choice that depends on the strength of each of the two orientations: 
economic (free market) and social. Thus, from the strategic management 
point of view, one option would be to embrace the dominating strategy 
thereby increasing the autonomy of public utilities managers’ autonomy 
(Kim and Prescott, 2005; Mulazzani, 1999; Ward, 1991). According to 
some authors, the problem is the influence on administration by public 
stakeholder, proposing to reduce the shares owned by public shareholders 
(Barzelay, 2001; Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003). Other studies focus on the 
typical features of private enterprises as capital structure, market value and 
investment decision of firms while attempting to maximize their interests 
(Bortolotti et al., 2011; Cambini and Rondi 2009; 2010; Cafferata, 1993).
At the same time, in order to guarantee the social function of such 
firms and to preserve public interests, there are some instances of former 
Italian public owners that have continued to influence the management 
policies of firms currently privatized, by reinventing - sui generis - on a 
public management side typical situations of relationship conflicts between 
principals and agents, typically of the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
For these reasons, in order to facilitate public governance management 
through with check and balance mechanisms (Hongjun and Hui, 2004), 
good practices and specific management tools should be developed, such 
as the process of stakeholders’ involvement (Gnan et al., 2013), further 
attempting to enhance and maximize the social orientation of companies of 
public interest domain (Bresciani and Ferraris, 2012; Elefanti, 2006).
In light of such a complex scenario, it deems interesting to investigate 
whether it is possible to balance the need for autonomy of the public 
utilities’ management and the need to protect their social function. In 
other words, drawing on the Dual Concern Model the query examined in 
this study revolves around the feasibility of embracing the integrating or 
compromising strategy.
2.2 Italian corporate governance on listed market
It should be assumed therefore that corporate governance system 
which exists in a country depends by a series of context variables, related 
to entrepreneurial and socio-political aspects as well (Del Giudice et al., 
2010). This assumption states a condition whereby we assume primarily 
that institutional regulatory system is country specific (Maggioni and Del 
Giudice, 2011); secondly that the application of a ’good corporate governance 
system’ depends positively on the ability of central governments to remove 
a very different set of institutional constraints to free market best practices’ 
adaption. In this regard, the Italian financial market since the 90s is marked 
by huge changes regarding legal and economic framework experienced by 
some major developments, such as a new Banking Law, the institutional 
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investors’ role, the stock market privatization, minorities’ protection law, 
securities law enactment (Bianchi and Bianco, 2006). 
Not least a corporate governance code (i.e. Codice di Autodisciplina 
delle Società Quotate) was introduced and subsequently twice revised in 
order to strengthen shareholders’ protection while attracting the attention 
of foreign institutional and private equity investors to Italian stock market. 
Originally, in the intention of regulators, all these changes had deeply 
modified the governance’s structure of Italian companies. However, the 
governance structure of Italian stock market nowadays suffers of several 
concerns about corporate and control structure of societies especially due 
to the abuse of Control Enhancing Mechanisms (CEMs) by the State and 
family entrepreneurs in order to guarantee control stability, reducing the 
transferability of majorities on primary market. 
State ownership, pyramidal groups, shareholder agreements, family 
trusts and bank coalitions are only some of the most known CEMs used 
in the corporate governance of both large and small enterprises of Italian 
capitalism. As results, there is no substantial increase in the access to 
Italian stock market by public investors. Then, the control of companies 
is still in the hands of a “financial elite” composed by the most important 
Italian family entrepreneurs, both bankers and industrials. 
From one side, these evidences highlight stability in the allocation of 
corporate control that allows larger Italian companies (e.g. public utilities) 
to escape from financial speculative games by enabling durable and long-
term governance stability. On the other side, nevertheless, the opacity of 
governance mechanisms may reduce management efficiency, that is the 
capacity of senior management for reducing the use of resources through 
return value maximization (Jensen, 2001). The main issue for both state 
and family controlled companies in the Italian market is linked to the 
phenomenon of separation between ownership and control that would 
enable top managers to pursue opportunistic and misleading behaviours. 
In this regard, to evaluate the efficiency and good practice of top 
management, corporate governance architecture seems to be a good proxy. 
Leaving to future research development on listed family business, this 
survey aims to offer a critical analysis on state ownership and control 
structure of public utilities listed firms, by analysing the dominance of 
state control on public utilities governance structure. 
In effect, by analysing ownership and control assets, we emphasize that a 
fully or majority state ownership control in the public utilities corporations 
can be effective in ensuring management autonomy, by assuring - at the 
same time - that critical decisions fall outside from speculative market 
influence. In this regard, State-centrality in corporate control of listed 
public utilities seems to be the main tools used for aligning requirements 
of efficiency-performance behaviours imposed to public management 
from market competition with special social objectives - borne by the State 
- to guarantee collective interests in sectors of public general interest.
We conclude that should not be forgotten that the “galassia” of state-
owned enterprises meets a political culture that - de facto - influences board 
composition, nominees, committees, roles and management objectives. 




The methodological approach incorporates the models of Cristofoli and 
Valotti (2008), Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), Boyd (1994) and Hoskisson 
et al. (1994). The empirical analysis concerns the 13 public utilities listed on 
the Milan Stock Exchange in September 1, 2011. For each company details 
about the ownership structure and corporate governance are provided, 
based on the analysis of the statutes, constitutive acts, financial statements 
and reports of corporate governance. The goals of the analysis are twofold: 
1) to gain an understanding with regard to the level of concentration of 
ownership, i.e. how much the public ownership is relevant to influence and 
determine strategic decisions within the company; 2) to explicate the level 
of management discretion in decision-making. 
Thus, following Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), the ownership structure 
is analysed through three variables: percentage % of capital share owned 
by public shareholders; the presence of minimum thresholds of number 
of stocks with voting rights that can be owned by private partners; public 
property constraints in the statute. According to the authors, the three 
variables provide clear evidence about the intention to maintain the power 
to direct and control the business activities. Then, following Boyd (1994) 
and Hoskisson et al. (1994), the corporate governance structure is analysed 
through four variables: (a) number of executive board members; (b) 
presence of a Chief Executive Officer; (c) the overlap between the roles of 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; (d) the number of active members 
within the Board of Directors. According to the authors the number of 
operative members is a clear sign of important managerial skills.
4. Findings and discussion
The comparison between ownership structure and corporate governance 
structure indicates the choices made by each firm. Thus, some of them reveal 
an imbalance toward public control or toward management independency. 
Other firms exhibit intermediate solutions attempting to balance between 
public control and managerial autonomy. By revoking Dual Concern Theory, 
the interconnection within corporate and control assets suggests that the 
management of public utilities requires balancing between the corporate’s 
own goal, namely the concern of meeting economics and financial objectives 
turned to stock’s value maximisation to the social stakeholder’s goal, namely 
the concern for stakeholders and consumers in maintaining a servicing 
utility (Jensen, 2001).
The analysis also highlights the following issues: the connection between 
the results obtained by the companies, their ownership and governance 
structure; the influence of the public player, and thus of policy, upon firms 
strategic choices; the presence or absence of internal control mechanisms; 
and the level of business orientation towards social development policies. In 
this regard, public utilities governance issues are highly multidimensional 
for both principals (municipalities and government) and agents (executive 
directors). In this way, even though the five conflict styles of Dual Concern 
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View can be subsumed, we assume that it is hard to generalize the on-going 
approach pursued by the public utilities galassia because the specificity of 
corporate and management structures from any two-dimensional typology 
of public utilities envisages different covenants and statements, as well. 
Dominating, for sure, is the only leadership style which we can interpret 
similarly to the management rules of the peer group of utilities. Empirical 
future researches could be considered in order to provide an analysis on 
implementation of integrating or compromising strategy by managers.
Ownership structure
The analysis of the ownership structure is based on three variables (see 
Table 1): (a) percentage % of capital share owned by public shareholders; (b) 
the presence of a public property constraint in the statute; (c) the presence 
of minimum thresholds of number of stocks with voting rights that can be 
owned by private partners. According to the authors, the three variables 
provide clear evidences about the intention to maintain the power to direct 
and control the business activities.
Tab. 1: Ownership structure of the Italian listed public utilities
PUBLIC UTILITY (a) (b) (c)
A2A
Municipality of Brescia (27.50%); 
Municipality of Milano (27.50%)
No reference
Max 5% if different from 
Municipalities of Brescia and 
Milano
ACEA Municipality of Roma (51.00%) No reference
Max 5% if different from 
Municipality of Roma
ACEGAS- APS Aceagas-Aps Holding (62.70%) * At least 50%+1 share Max 5%
ACQUE POTABILI
Iren Acqua Gas spa (30.86%); 
Smat spa (30.86%)
No reference No reference
ACSM-AGAM
Municipality of Monza (29.12%); 
Municipality of Como (24.76%); 
A2A (21.94%)
No reference
Max 4% if different from 
Municipality of Como
ALERION No reference No reference No reference
ASCOPIAVE Asco Holding spa (61.56%) No reference No reference
EDISON Transalpina di Energia No reference No reference
ENEL
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (17.40%); 
Ministry of Economy (13.90%)
No reference Max 3%
ENEL GREEN
POWER
Enel spa (69.17%) No reference No reference
HERA
Municipality of Bologna (14.99%); 
Municipality of Ravenna (7.39%); 
Municipality of Imola (5.32%); 
Municipalities of Ferrara, Rimini, 




Municipality of Reggio Emilia 
(8.38%); Municipality of Parma 
(6.60%)
At least 51% Max 5%
SNAM RETE GAS Eni spa (52.54%) No reference No reference
TERNA Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (29.85%) No reference Max 5%
      
(*) Aceagas-Aps Holding is a public company (Municipality of Trieste 50.10% and 
Municipality of Padova 49.90%); Asco Holding spa is a public company (93 
Municipalities); Transalpina di Energia is a public company (A2A, Iren, and others)
Source: personal elaboration from statutes and reports of corporate governance
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In eight (8) out of thirteen (13) cases the public partner has the majority 
of capital and in the other five (5) cases there is an important public share 
(i.e. from Iren - 14.98% to Enel - 31.30%) (see Figure 1).
Moreover, in three cases (Acegas-Aps, Hera and Iren) there is a public 
property constraint in the statute; namely a clear intention of the owner to 
maintain the public control. Finally, in eight (8) cases there is a presence of 
minimum thresholds of numbers of stocks with voting rights that cannot 
be owned by public partners (i.e. from Hera - 2% to A2a, Acea, Iren and 
Terna - 5%).
The analysis of the three variables clearly shows that the ownership 
structure is characterized by a significant presence of public ownership 
and control. Even though there are only three (3) cases of a public property 
constraint, in fact, in eight (8) cases there is a constraint in the numbers of 
shares available by no public owner.
Fig. 1: Share of public ownership of the Italian listed public utilities
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Corporate Governance Architecture
The analysis of the corporate governance structure is based on four 
variables (see Table 2): (a) number of Board of Directors members; (b) 
presence of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO); (c) the overlap of Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer roles, otherwise namely CEO duality; and (d) 
the number of executive members within the Board of Directors.
The number of Board of Directors members ranges from four 
(Ascopiave) to eighteen (Hera). A2A is the only company with a unique 
corporate governance structure, based on two boards: the supervisory board, 
composed of fifteen members and the board of management, composed of 
eight members.
As can be seen in Table 2, the number of executive members within 
the Board of Directors is very low, by and large limited to the President 
and the CEO. The presence of the CEO, in almost all the listed Italian 
public companies, provides a clear evidence that the corporate governance 
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Tab. 2: Corporate governance structure of the Italian listed public utilities
PUBLIC UTILITY (a) (b) (c) (d)
A2A (*) 15+8 No No 0
ACEA 9 Yes No 2/9
ACEGAS- APS 13 Yes No 2/13
ACQUE POTABILI 9 Yes No 4/9
ACSM-AGAM 10 Yes No 2/10
ASCOPIAVE 4 No No 2/4
EDISON 13 Yes No 4/13
ENEL 11 Yes No 4/11
ENEL GREEN POWER 10 Yes No 2/10
HERA 18 Yes No 2/18
IREN 13 Yes No 2/13
SNAM RETE GAS 5 Yes No 2/5
TERNA 9 Yes No 2/9
 
(*)  A2A is structured in a Supervisory Board (15 members) plus a Board of Management (8 
members)
Source: personal elaboration from statutes and reports of corporate governance
5. Conclusions, limitations and future research perspectives 
The research has combined empirical data with an extensive literature 
review to investigate whether it is possible to balance the necessities of 
autonomy of the management of public utilities with the need to protect 
their social function. Inescapably, this primary step to scientifically 
substantiate a theorem and to give it form and essence has produced results 
of a strongly conceptual disposition. The concept and model, nonetheless, 
carry in parallel significant practical value as well.
Firstly, as emerged from the literature review, the relationship between 
public ownership and management of public utilities figures prominently 
on the research agenda. The dynamics characterizing the industry of 
public utilities for nearly a decade emphasize the need for the public 
owner to rethink its role in relation to companies operating in increasingly 
liberalized environments. The current study shows that it is possible to 
concurrently maintain strong public ownership structures and to achieve 
excellent results from the management point of view. In line with this 
logic, the findings suggest the opportunity to reframe the managerial 
debate concerning privatization of public utilities: rather than focusing 
solely on the need to privatize public utilities to reflect on how to promote 
the functioning of public utilities (including the ones which are strictly 
public) in the liberalized market. 
Secondly, the analysis of governance systems in the Italian listed public 
utilities implies the importance of the corporate governance framework as 
a tool for balancing between the need to protect public interests and the 
need to secure the autonomy of the enterprise. Specifically, the analysis 
emphasizes the key significance of corporate governance systems in 
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contrast with the minor importance of ownership structures. Generally 
speaking, Italian listed public utilities are characterized by a strong influence 
of the public actor owner, against systems of governance that recognize a 
management’s autonomy. 
The current study provides some preliminary answers in that regard. 
Corporate governance systems that relay tasks of ordinary and extraordinary 
management to the top governing boards seem to be able to guarantee the 
autonomy of enterprises, even within the limitations placed by the public 
shareholder to protect the collective interests. In fact, they stretch the 
chain of command by moving away decision making from policy. Along 
these lines, one of the solutions is the introduction of the two-tier system; 
namely, splitting the Board of Directors into a Supervisory Board and into a 
Management Board (i.e. the A2A corporate governance structure), thereby 
creating a filter between public ownership and the management of the 
company. 
Additional insights emerge from the analysis of the entire system of 
government, including the incentive mechanisms, monitoring boards 
and mechanisms of accountability (Valotti, 2006). First, mechanisms that 
encourage accountability of the management in achieving the goals set 
by the public shareholder can ensure public control and at the same time 
largely retain the firm’s autonomy. Second, advanced supervisory boards can 
monitor the progress of management. Finally, reporting systems that make 
management accountable not only about the financial results but also about 
social and economic results obtained, may be useful tools for accountability 
with respect to the protection of public interests. Altogether, applying 
advanced tools of corporate governance should boost the awareness and 
more open attitude of local government authorities (including owners) and 
of citizens (including members and shareholders in some cases towards 
public utilities. 
Finally, we stand just a few words concerning the limitations of the study. 
The empirical focus on Italy implies that some country-specific institutions 
affect the industrial behaviour and performance of the observed firms in a 
more significant way than any of the industry-specific context conditions. 
Also, the analysis does not take adequately into account interference effects 
between industries (e.g., cross-sectorial learning), which may be relevant to 
explain the pattern of interaction and outcome in some industries because 
of complementarity and substitution effects or because of synergies between 
firms’ business areas. Furthermore, the analysis conducted here is largely 
interpretative and exploratory, rather than subjecting any hypothesis to 
statistical test.
While our research is a significant step forward in the path to 
understanding the Italian public utilities sector, this area of knowledge is 
still underdeveloped. Our experience on the subject suggests that further 
research is required to define, refine, validate and interrelate the various 
elements involved. More specifically, it is suggested that further research 
should concentrate on other countries as well and compare the results 
internationally. More importantly, further researches must determine 
more specifically the generated values of privatizations, both in terms of 
performance and social utility. 
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This study may lead the way to a new and interesting line of research in 
discipline of corporate governance at the international level. In particular, 
public control often influences the link between the strengthening of 
the control mechanisms and the inefficiency of the service provided, 
by assuming a negative role. In contrast, the present study tries to bring 
out the aspects of exquisitely managerial and typical administration 
peculiarities, both at a business and organizational level, which can have 
a state-control conduction, in order to ensure a goal of Pareto optimum 
allocation of essential public services, thus assuming a positive will. This 
research effort would help better the understanding of whether countries 
sharing homogeneous institutional traits exhibit similar problems in 
implementing liberalization and re-regulation processes. 
Unavoidably, this calls for further research on both sides. From the 
past research’s point of view, to test the projections; and from the present 
research’s point of view, to further verify the findings. Regarding the latter, 
it is recommended that further researches perform similar work (a) in 
other geographical contexts, possibly also in less-developed countries; (b) 
which is sector-specific; (c) which is also size-focused.
On a catalectic note, this research calls for a re-evaluation or at least 
reinterpretation of some commonly held beliefs on public utilities sector, 
not just in relation to performance, but other aspects as well. They are 
firms whose performance aspect affects many of its other traits, but most 
of all those of a social nature. This entails that their differences are not 
only deep, but also of a less tangible and less visible nature. In other words, 
managers implement change processes to sustain legitimacy goals, more 
than looking for technical efficiency or qualitative performances to meet 
community expectations. Moreover, changes in managerial approach 
were also in evidence, even if not tangible. For example, the success of 
organizational change in public utilities is correlated with a participative 
management style. In other words, we found a possible balance between 
the two conflicting pressures in the use of compromising or integrating 
approach like a shift from “management control” to “commitment 
management” aimed at aligning the interests of employees with those of 
managers, through the appropriate selection of incentives.
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